The incentives created by transparency in the costs of justice or the Dissertation

The incentives created by transparency in the costs of justice or the lack thereof - Dissertation Example However, transparency in this regard is superficial as ordinary members of the public rarely spend time in courts observing trials unless they are parties to a case and thus are wholly unaware of the rulings, the contents of the rulings, the rationale, ratio decidendi and how those rulings compare to previous rulings. Moreover, ordinary members of the public are also generally unaware of the court hierarchal structure and will not know whether or not a ruling by one court is binding on another court or whether or not a ruling in one court is invalid because it failed to follow a ruling by a higher court. In this regard, transparency only benefits experts and members of the public must pay for expert advice and knowledge. Complicating matters, the cost of this advice is far from transparent since it varies from one lawyer to another and changes according to the special circumstances and facts of a particular case. It is against this background that this research study applies game the ory’s coordination model and Nash equilibrium model which theoretically at least, helps to shed light on the factors that influence actors in making the decision to litigate. ... a cost-benefit analysis of the â€Å"legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking.†1 Informed by game theory, this paper uses the model created by Mattiacci and Deffains in analysing the incentives created by transparency in the cost of justice. The results of a survey conducted in Europe involving 1080 respondents are used to confirm the author’s contention that potential litigants are concerned with outcomes and the cost of litigation. In other words, transparency in the cost of justice can result in more litigation if the costs of justice in terms of legal fees and related expenses are low but can result in less litigation if the costs of justice are high or disproportionate to the award contemplated by the dispute. It is therefore concluded that transparency and its twin partner certainty/uncertainty informs the potential litigant’s decision, but only via attorneys who can understand the information generated by precedents and this information is availab le at uncertain costs. Based on information relative to outcome, the law, strategies/intentions of other actors, and the socio-economic cost involved in obtaining relevant information and the desired outcome, potential litigants will decide on one of three things: accept the consequences of the legal dispute and do nothing; settle the matter privately; or rely on formal adjudication to resolve the dispute. Table of contents Abstract 2 Introduction 3 Dari-Mattiacci and Deffains’ Model 9 Research Questions 16 Aims and Objectives 17 Statement of the Problem 17 Significance of the Study 18 Research Methodology 19 Organization of the Study 20 A Review of the Literature 21 Transparency 21 Game Theory 30 Transparency and the Incentive to Litigate or not to Litigate 41 Findings and Conclusion 55 Bibliography 64